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I started working in the area of banking and finance after my PhD when I joined the BoE in May 2007 
as a research economist in the Payment System Research Team. I contributed to the project “Making 
Payment Systems Economics Mainstream” which included co-authoring chapters of a book on large- 
value payment systems and developing empirical methods to analyze risks and vulnerabilities in the 
UK large-value payment system and the overnight interbank market. 
 
When I moved to the Research Group of the World Bank I shifted my research focus to the area of 
bank capital regulation. This part of my research analyses the role of bank capital –does it reduce 
risk-taking and improve bank stability during crisis, how should it be defined by regulators. 
 
Since rejoining academia in 2013 I have pursued research on the identification and measurement of 
risks and vulnerabilities in the financial system. The objectives of my main ongoing project at the 
University of Lausanne is to understand the drivers of the rapid expansion in offshore dollar credit in 





2. Contribution on payment systems and interbank markets 
 
The objective of my first publication in collaboration with Jochen Schanz (article 1) was to develop and 
apply a novel empirical method to analyze the intra-day liquidity management strategy of banks in the 
UK payment system using a large amount of high frequency data. 
 
Intraday liquidity requirements in large-value real-time gross payment systems can substantially 
exceed the liquidity that its direct members hold overnight on their accounts with the central bank. As 
an illustration, UK banks’ aggregate holdings of reserve balances with the Bank of England fluctuated 
around £30 billion in 2008, while the daily amount of liquidity that banks pass through the United 
Kingdom’s large-value payment system, CHAPS, was in the order of £250 billion. Effective intra-day 
liquidity management in these systems is therefore crucial to allow the completion of large transactions 
such as house purchases, interbank loans, and other financial market transactions. To this purpose, 
banks recycle liquidity in these systems during the day: that is, they partly rely on incoming funds to 
settle their outgoing payments. 
 
The IT systems that member banks use to access large-value payment systems are occasionally 
affected by operational problems. These member-level operational outages are of concern to central 
banks (who oversee payment systems) particularly because they can inhibit the efficient intra-day 
recycling of liquidity. Not only can prolonged outages lead to a misallocation of liquidity between 
banks, they can ultimately also damage the stability of the financial system. The reason is that a 
comparatively common class of operational problems prevents the affected bank from sending 
payments but not from receiving payments on its account with the central bank. There is therefore a 
risk that the bank experiencing operational problems involuntarily absorbs liquidity and becomes a 
‘liquidity sink’. The liquidity that the affected bank holds becomes unavailable for the settlement of 
payments between other, healthy settlement banks. Thus, if (healthy) banks fail to sufficiently control 
their intraday liquidity requirements, operational risk at one bank can be a source of systemic risk. 
 
We investigated how settlement banks in CHAPS react to outages experienced by another CHAPS 
settlement bank. Our aim was to improve our understanding of how banks manage intraday liquidity 
risk, and to assess the systemic importance of member-level operational outages. 
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The fact that banks stop making payments to a bank experiencing an outage reduces systemic risk: 
this bank does not become a liquidity sink, and liquidity remains available to settle outstanding 
payments between healthy banks. Indeed, we show that the value of payment flows between healthy 
banks remains virtually unchanged during an outage. Banks effectively contain the disruption caused 
by the operational outage: healthy banks stop making payments to the stricken bank (and more rapidly 
so when interbank funding markets are disrupted) while payment flows between healthy banks remain 
unaffected during an outage. Through this research we introduced novel empirical methods to facilitate 
the monitoring of activity in the payment systems which was previously rendered difficult by the large 
amount and high-frequency of the data generated by such activity. 
 
The payment system is a key element of the financial infrastructure, its smooth functioning is crucial 
for the implementation of monetary policy. Institutional and technological characteristics of  the 
payment system may cause differences in the optimal amount of reserve to achieve price stability. And 
an efficient payments system is indispensable to the functioning of the interbank markets. A weak 
payments system may severely drag on the stability and developmental capacity of an economy. In 
article 2 co-authored with Erlend Nier we assess the contribution to economic development of 
introducing modern and efficient payment systems. Using payment system reforms in Eastern 
European countries over the 1995–2005, we find evidence that payment system reforms were an 
important precondition for the credit boom observed in our sample countries. We also find that 
payment system reforms led to a shift away from cash (outside money) and towards demand deposits 
(inside money) as a medium of exchange and that this in turn enabled an expansion of credit in the 
sample countries. These findings have important implications for our understanding of financial 
intermediation, highlighting the nexus between banks’ role as providers of payment services and as 







3. Contributions on interbank markets 
 
Interbank markets are generally the private lender-of-last-resort for banks’ short-term liquidity needs. 
Inadequate liquidity flow through these markets has the potential to substantially impair real and 
financial sectors. The financial crisis of 2007–09 has highlighted the important role played by money 
markets (short-term borrowing and lending markets between  banks and bank-like institutions)  in 
allocating liquidity around the financial system. 
 
If liquidity does not get channeled through the banking system to its most efficient use, then 
intermediation to households and corporations could stagnate. In addition, central banks’ transmission 
mechanisms for monetary policy could be rendered less effective if its liquidity provision gets trapped 
on the balance sheets of some banks instead of lubricating the flow of credit among banks. In turn, 
central banks may be forced to resort to emergency lending operations, as was done by the New York 
Federal Reserve, the Bank of England (BoE), the European Central Bank (ECB), and other central 
banks during the crisis. 
 
Article 3 is an attempt to understand some of these effects by examining the bank demand for liquidity 
and its effect on interbank markets during the crisis. We hypothesize and confirm a precautionary 
motive to liquidity demand by banks during this period and investigate its causal effect on interbank 
rates. The UK interbank market being a small market where few banks are active and have built strong 
relationships, we emphasize and confirm that heightened asymmetric information is not an important 
factor that caused this market to freeze so quickly in 2007-2008. 
 
Our broad conclusion is that events unfolding since August 9 2007 increased the funding or rollover 
risk of banks, in response to which banks, especially the weaker ones, hoarded liquidity. Given their 
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increased opportunity cost of giving up liquidity to other banks, interbank rates rose in both secured 
and unsecured markets, suggestive of interest rate contagion through the interbank market. 
 
As our first piece of evidence, we show that settlement bank liquidity experienced a significant upward 














































As our second piece of evidence, we show that this build-up of bank liquidity was precautionary in 
nature. First, we verify that settlement banks held more liquidity on days with greater predictable 
aggregate payment activity; indeed funding needs arising from idiosyncratic payments fluctuations are 
more easily met through borrowing from other banks in the overnight market. 
 
Such a response of settlement bank liquidity to aggregate payment activity was nonexistent in the 
precrisis period. Next, we employ bank-level variations in liquidity, funding risk proxies, solvency risk 
proxies, and economic health during the crisis.  We find that banks that during the crisis had higher 
funding or rollover risk, and higher solvency risk hoarded more li uidity (Figure 2). Further, these 
banks held more liquidity in response to increases in payment activity. Even though, on average, there 
was no increase in variability in payment activity in the sterling money markets during the crisis, our 
results confirm that, given the funding problems, settlement banks viewed the same variability of 
payment activity during the crisis with greater precaution. This setting therefore allows us to f cus on a 
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broader factor, that is, financial constraint driving precau ionary demand, rather than factors internal to 











































Figure 2. Average reserve targets of the high-risk banks (three anks with highest loan to retail 
deposits ratio), and the low-risk banks (three banks with lowest loan to retail deposits ratio), in billions 




In our third piece of evidence, we study the effect of settlement banks liquidity demand on interbank 
markets. In normal times, the “arbitrage” hypothesis in money markets postulates that if interbank 
rates become higher than the BoE policy rate, then banks that experience an exogenous rise in their 
liquidity release the liquidity to other needy banks to capture the spread. This should induce a negative 
relation between settlement ban liquidity and interbank preads. 
 
We call this the “arbitrage” effect. Our crucial observation is that this relation may be reversed when 
the rise in liquidity demand of settlement banks is endogenous, in particular, a precautionary response 
to heightened risks and funding concerns. In this case, settlement banks need to be compensated 
more for releasing liquidity to others. We call this the “liquidity” effect. 
 
The results reveal a strong effect of settlement bank liquidity on interbank rates, but in a manner that 
differs sharply between precrisis and postcrisis periods. We find evidence supportive of the liquidity 
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effect: the effect of liquidity is to raise overnight interbank rates in the period during the crisis. In 
contrast, the relation between liquidity and interbank rates was significantly negative in the period prior 
to the crisis, consistent with the arbitrage effect of settlement bank liquidity on interbank rates. It is 
striking that the effect of settlement bank liquidity on secured rates—in transactions secured by UK 
gilts—is as high and significant as on the unsecured rates, if not stronger. 
 
We interpret these findings to imply that, since access to capital markets and wholesale borrowing in 
commercial paper markets was impaired for banks, especially for banks with significant rollover or 
credit risk, these weaker banks engaged in liquidity hoarding as a precautionary response. Such 
hoarding raised borrowing rates for safer banks too, suggesting a contagion-style systemic risk 
operating through interbank markets. In particular, the overnight sterling interbank rates in the 1st year 
of the crisis did not seem to have been driven purely by the counterparty risk concerns of lending 
banks about the borrowing banks. In addition, since smaller, second-tier banks borrow mainly from 
large settlement banks in the secured interbank market, the latter market was also substantially 
affected by the liquidity hoarding of large settlement banks. 
 
Finally, we use bilateral transaction data, which allow us to more cleanly separate out the 
precautionary effect from the counterparty risk effect, and we find further supportive evidence for our 
interpretation. The rate charged by one bank to another (the bilateral spread) during the crisis is 
negatively associated with the borrower liquidity buffer, but more importantly, the rate is positively 
associated with the lender liquidity buffer: a lender who has a higher demand for liquidity during the 
crisis charges a higher price to release it during the crisis. This finding confirms that the positive 
relationship between rate and liquidity demand observed in the aggregate data during the crisis 
contains a precautionary demand effect. We also show that high risk banks participate less in the 
market (lending and borrowing less and trading with fewer counterparties), but this is true both before 
and during the crisis. 
 
Article 3 cuts across a number of different strands of literature, particularly, regarding (i) reasons why 
firms hoard cash, (ii) the function played by interbank  markets  and  the reasons why they  may 
experience stress, (iii) the transmission of bank-level stress as contagion in the financial sector, and 
(iv) the micro-structure of interbank markets in terms of reserves requirements by central banks and 
the monetary policy. The fact that the onset of the subprime crisis led banks to hoard liquidity as a 
precaution against funding risk finds its parallel in the corporate finance literature on financial 
constraints. Large banks in the payments system settle a large volume of transactions on a daily basis 
and when the volume becomes large or uncertain, they hold extra liquidity simply to be able to effect 
these transactions smoothly. If their access to external financing dries up, this theory predicts they will 
hoard more cash. 
 
On the policy front, our evidence suggests that regulatory attempts to thaw such money market stress 
and reduce the variability of interbank rates, if successful, can have salubrious effects on healthier 
parts of the banking sector. Our results, however, suggest that, to the extent that a part of the stress 
emanates from the liquidity hoardings of banks with troubled funding and balance sheet conditions, 
such a thawing should involve addressing insolvency concerns (e.g., early supervision and stress 




4.   Contributions on bank capital 
 
The global financial crisis has led to widespread calls to reform bank regulation and supervision. 
Changes in bank capital regulation have been at the heart of the policy discussions. In redesigning 
prudential standards to incorporate lessons from the recent turmoil, the Basel committee of 
supervisors has grappled with two important questions among others: what type of capital should 
banks hold to ensure that they can better withstand periods of economic and financial stress? And 
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should a simple leverage ratio be introduced to reduce regulatory arbitrage and improve 
transparency? 
 
The empirical findings and policy lessons from the research I carried out with colleagues at the World 
Bank are manifold. First, we find support for the view that a stronger capital position is an important 
asset during a systemic crisis, suggesting that the current emphasis on strengthening capital 
requirements is broadly appropriate. Second, our results indicate that the introduction of a minimum 
leverage ratio to supplement minimum risk-adjusted capital requirements is important, as properly 
measuring risk exposure is very difficult especially for large and complex financial organizations, and 
complex definitions of regulatory capital give room to manipulation. Finally, our studies indicate that 
greater emphasis on “higher quality capital” in the form of Tier 1 capital or tangible equity is justified. 
 
 
In article 4 co-authored with Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache we study whether better- 
capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among 
various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk-adjusted ratio; the leverage ratio; the Tier 1 and Tier 2 
ratios; and the tangible equity ratio. 
 
Since the first Basel capital accord in 1988, the prevailing approach to bank regulation has put capital 
at front and center: more capital should make banks better able to absorb losses with their own 
resources, without becoming insolvent or necessitating a bailout with public funds. In addition, by 
forcing bank owners to have some “skin in the game,” minimum capital requirements should curb 
incentives for excessive risk taking created by limited liability and amplified by deposit insurance and 
bailout expectations. Over the last 20 years, regulatory capital requirements have been refined and 
broadened to cover various types of risk, differentiate among asset classes of different risk, and allow 
for a menu of approaches to determine the risk weights to be applied to each asset category. In the 
process, the rules have become increasingly elaborate, reflecting the growing complexity of modern 
banking, but also the need to address ongoing efforts by regulated entities to circumvent the 
requirements through financial innovation. While regulatory consensus has viewed capital  as an 
essential tool to limit risk-taking, there has been less agreement among economic theorists. A number 
of theoretical models bear out the relationship posited by regulators that minimum capital requirements 
ameliorate the moral hazard created by deposit insurance, but others find that such requirements, by 
reducing the charter value of banks, have the opposite effect. 
 
The recent financial crisis undoubtedly demonstrated that existing capital regulation, in its design or 
implementation, was inadequate to prevent a panic in the financial sector, and once again 
governments around the world had to step in with emergency support to prevent a collapse. Many of 
the banks that were rescued appeared to be in compliance with minimum capital requirements shortly 
before and even during the crisis. In the ensuing debate over how to strengthen regulation, capital 
continues to play an important role. 
 
We evaluated the effectiveness of Basel II capital regulations and tested existing theories that 
motivate the use of capital regulation to curb bank risk taking. If bank capital truly helps curbing bank 
risk-taking incentives and absorbing losses, we would expect that, when a large, unexpected negative 
shock to bank value materializes—as was the case with the financial crisis that began in August 
2007—equity market participants would judge better-capitalized banks to be in a better position to 
withstand the shock, and the stock price of these banks would not fall as much as that of poorly 
capitalized banks. 
 
A second question that we address in article 4 is which concept of capital was more relevant to stock 
valuation during the crisis. Existing capital requirements are set as a proportion of risk exposure; but if 
the risk exposure calculation under Basel rules did not reflect actual risk, capital measures based on 
cruder risk-exposure proxies, such as total assets, may have been considered as more meaningful by 
equity traders. The flaws of Basel I risk weights included the 50% risk weight for loans secured by 
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mortgages, the zero risk weights on sovereign debt, and incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage 
caused by the lack of differentiation among commercial loans of different quality. Critics of Basel II 
questioned the increased reliance on credit rating agencies to determine risk weights (given that rating 
agencies are paid by the rated parties) and the reliance on banks’ own (internal) models, which are not 
transparent and create problems of consistency between banks. 
 
A third issue is the types of instrument that are counted as capital for regulatory purposes. As 
recognized by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, under some banks were able to show 
strong capitalization while  holding  a  limited  amount of  tangible common equity,  which  is  the 
component of capital that is available to absorb losses while the bank remains a going concern. In our 
regressions, we test whether banks with higher quality 
market participants. 
apital were viewed more positively by equity 
 
We find support for the hypothe is that better-capitalized banks experienced a smaller decline in their 
equity value during the crisis. However, the effect is large and robust only for a subsample comprising 
the larger banks. For this group, we also find that stock returns durin the crisis were more sensitive to 
the leverage ratio than to the risk-adjusted Basel ratio, an indication that market participants may have 
viewed the risk-adjustment under Basel as uninformative during the crisis (Figure 3). Finally, we also 
find some evidence that Tier 1 capital was seen as the more relevant notion of capital, especially in 











































In articles 5 and 6 we provide further evidence that better capitalized banks fared better in the crisis 
and reduced credit to the non-financial sector less when they held capital of higher quality and when 
they were subjected to a limit on leverage. 
 
Article 5 documents the characteristics of public recapitalizations of banks undertaken since 2008 and 
examines their relationship with bank lending. We show that banks with a higher Tier1 capital ratio had 
a lower probability of being recapitalized and received less capital and that only large and high loss- 
absorbing capital injections had salubrious effects on bank lending. Since banks that receive public 
capital also had lower solvency and liquidity ratios immediately before the crisis, one can argue that 
our actually estimated effects of recapitalization on credit supply are potentially biased downwards. 
Whilst this concern leaves our qualitative results largely intact, it implies that our point estimates 
should be regarded as lower bounds. 
 
This work augments the recent literature on bank bailouts by analysing the effect of public 
recapitalizations at the bank level. The benefit from this degree of disaggregation is that we could look 
at specific bank and bailout characteristics in order to inform future policies and to derive lessons for 
the many conditionalities that the theoretical literature has proposed. 
 
In article 6 we provide evidence that the fact the Islamic banks performed better in the crisis and are 
less likely to des-intermediate than conventional banks is essentially attributable to the fact that they 
were better capitalized. 
 
Article 7 provides further support for the introduction of a leverage ratio alongside risk-based capital. 
Here we report direct evidence that banks misreport risk. A number of recent reports and academic 
papers suggest that the risk-sensitivity of Basel II risk-weights is limited. Using a larger sample and 
focusing on the effect of IRB approval, we are able to provide evidence suggesting that banks did 
indeed make strategic use of methodological changes. 
 
We find that reported riskiness declines once banks are allowed to use internal-rating models and 
becomes disconnected with actual risk (see Figures 4 & 5)), and that the effect is stronger among 
weakly capitalised banks. The latter result, in particular, is consistent with theoretical work suggesting 
that: (a) the IRB introduces an opportunity for banks to under-report the riskiness of their assets, and 
thus to overstate regulatory capital; and (b) low levels of capital strengthen the incentives to exploit 
this opportunity. Additional support for the hypothesis of systematic bias under the IRB is derived from 
observing a less marked decline in risk-weights when supervisory scrutiny is high, and from showing 
that reported riskiness tends to increase prior to bank failure if banks had not adopted the IRB. In 
cases where they had adopted it, we find no increase, and if banks were also weakly capitalised, 
reported riskiness declined prior to resolution. Weakly capitalised banks also appear to raise dividend 
payments more upon IRB approval, and their risk models do not appear to be less precise. Consistent 
with regulatory arbitrage, these findings suggest that more fragile banks generally behave less 
prudently, and that their risk-weights are not just accidentally biased. 
 
These findings complement narrative evidence of banks overstating regulatory capital and lend 
empirical support to the theory of risk-weight manipulation. They also corroborate the intuition that a 
regulated entity should not be involved in setting its own constraints, and emphasize that regulatory 
complexity encourages regulatory arbitrage. Generally, our work is also related to the literature 













































































I am currently working, in collaboration with Philippe Bacchetta, on a project on the offshore dollar 
credit market. In this section I would like to briefly summarize the motivations, objectives, and first 






Since 2009, offshore dollar credit, i.e. dollar credit to non-US resident, has boomed to unprecedented 
levels. According to the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) data the level of activity in this market 
had reached $ 8 trillion by mid-2014, representing 13% of non-US GDP. This expansion has been 
fuelled by low US interest rates leading corporate issuers to shift from domestic currency to dollar, 
most notably in high interest rate countries and among distressed Eurozone corporates. Interestingly, 
most of the offshore dollar credit is in countries that are not usually considered dollarized economies 
and is extended by non-US banks. 
 
Despite its importance we know very little about the offshore dollar credit market, apart from aggregate 
descriptive statistics of the size of the market and its geographical distribution. 
 
Foreign currency credit has implications for the effectiveness of the borrowers’ home country monetary 
policy transmission mechanism and for financial stability. Surges in foreign currency capital inflows in 
the form of cross-border bank credit can enable credit booms that threaten the stability of global 
banks, and of domestic borrowers who are vulnerable to sudden withdrawal and exchange rate risk. 
There is aggregate evidence from the macroeconomic literature that massive inflows of capital are 
related to credit booms and busts and a rapid build-up of leverage. And that past history of credit 
growth is a robust predictor of financial crisis. 
 
In this project we exploit microeconomic data of the offshore dollar credit market (at the borrower and 
bank level) to study in more details the link between credit expansions and financial fragility. 
Microeconomic data covering several countries allow us to identify the direct causal effect of a credit 
expansion on lending standards and the quality of global banks’ portfolios and to explore 
heterogeneous effects across banks and across different market structures. Understanding 








The objective of the project is to address the following questions: 
 
1. Is the recent boom in offshore dollar credit demand or supply driven? Is the level of 
competition among lenders an important conditioning factor of the  switch from  domestic 
currency to dollar? 
2. Is an expansion in offshore dollar credit associated with a softening of credit policies 
and hence a deterioration in global banks’ portfolio? More precisely, has the boom been 
associated with more lending to low-credit quality borrowers and to unhedged borrowers 
(borrowers with a negative exposure to a dollar appreciation)? When foreign banks chose to 
lend in dollar to unhedged borrowers they transfer the currency risk to the borrower but also 
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transform it into credit risk. The reason is that unhedged borrowers are likely to default on their 
dollar debt when the dollar appreciates. 
3. Do banks price the additional risk of lending to unhedged borrowers? Does the 
underlying market structure matter in determining the extent to which banks adjust credit 
policies in a boom and whether they adequately price risk? 
4. How is the quality of the offshore dollar portfolio of global banks affected by factors 
such as bank capital and geographical diversification? Does bank capital curb risk taking? Is 
geographical diversification associated with weaker monitoring efforts? 
 
We study separately the case of emerging market borrowers and Eurozone leveraged borrowers 
because drivers of the demand and supply of dollar credit may be quite different in these two cases. 
For example, we expect that in the Eurozone the contraction of domestic credit and disruptions in 
interbank and swap markets may have played an important role in triggering the shift to dollar. In 
emerging markets, interest differentials should matter more. 
 
Findings so far: Eurozone case study 
 
 
In this first study we document that, despite international financial disintegration, foreign currency 
borrowing among leveraged Eurozone corporates has boomed during the financial crisis. Using firm- 
level borrowing data, we trace this increase to two main symptoms of the global financial crisis: (1) a 
domestic credit crunch causing leveraged corporates to switch to foreign banks; and (2) a higher 
funding cost in the borrower home currency causing foreign banks to increasingly transfer currency 
risk to the borrower. 
 
Further, we show that disruptions in swap markets led exporters to increasingly shift from currency 
swaps to foreign currency bank credit. While large high-credit quality corporates could tap the bond 
market during the credit crunch, lower-credit quality borrowers turned to foreign banks, which 
increased their market power. 
 
Although global bank lending is often reported to amplify the international credit cycle, we show that 
foreign banking acted as a shock absorber that weathered the real consequences of the credit crunch 
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